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 Judicial Bias:  The Ongoing Challenge 
KATHLEEN MAHONEY QC, FRSC* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article calls for a renewed commitment to judicial education on the roles 
that gender, race, class and other biases can have on judicial decisions and impar-
tiality.  This article also calls for the appointment of a more representative and 
diverse judiciary.  An explosion of activity occurred for about a decade between 
the late 1980s until the late 1990s to promote and implement social context educa-
tion for judges to help judges understand the realities of people most unlike them-
selves, and to appoint judges to be more representative of the population of Cana-
da.  But this trend has diminished to the point that judicial gender and other forms 
of bias are now rarely talked about or included in judicial education curricula.  
Judicial appointments once again are tilted sharply in favor of white male partners 
in large law firms.
1
  This article argues that this disparity raises valid concerns 
about judicial impartiality, and new concerns about equality and discrimination 
are beginning to emerge.  The first part of this article discusses the history of judi-
cial education in Canada and the leadership role the Canadian judiciary took in 
creating and developing groundbreaking judicial education programs on social 
context issues both in Canada and internationally.  The second section discusses 
case law since 2000, critiquing it for the paucity of social context analysis and 
preference for white male judicial appointments.  The conclusion calls for a re-
newed effort to create socially relevant judicial education in current times and for 
a more representative judiciary. 
II.  HISTORY 
I graduated from the University of British Columbia Law School in 1976 and 
from Cambridge University in 1979.  At that time, women comprised no more 
than 25% of the students in my classes.
2
  By the time I started teaching law in 
1980, I found myself in a totally white, male dominated faculty, but the number of 
female students was rapidly rising to comprise about 40% of each incoming class.  
Throughout this period as my awareness about how the law functioned deepened, 
I came to understand the profound disadvantages women experienced in their 
                                                          
*   Professor of Law, Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, University of Calgary.  Professor Ma-
honey is an expert in the development of judicial education programs in Canada and internationally, 
having pioneered social context programs for judges in Canada, Australia, South Africa and other 
countries. 
 1.   Krystle Gill & Alycia Shaw, Representing Canada on the bench: On gender balance, equality 
and judicial appointments, THE CANADIAN BAR ASSOC’N,  
http://www.cba.org/CBA/conf_women/Women_Newsletters2013/bench.aspx (last visited Aug. 25, 
2015); Stephen Lautens, Cracking the System, CAN. LAWYER (Sept. 1, 2014),  
www.canadianlawyermag.com/5266/Cracking-the-system.html. 
 2. This statistic was common across jurisdictions in Canada, Australia and the United States at that 
time.  See SUSAN EHRLICH MARTIN & NANCY C. JURIK, DOING JUSTICE, DOING GENDER:  WOMEN IN 
LEGAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE OCCUPATIONS 111-13 (2nd ed. 2012). 
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encounters with the justice system.
3
  My study, engagement, and research taught 
me that deeply entrenched structural discrimination and exclusion existed in law.
4
  
Exacerbating the problem was the fact that judging, judicial authority and en-
forcement of laws were overwhelmingly exercised and implemented by male, 
masculine, white, heterosexual, able-bodied, and class-privileged persons who, as 
a class, stood to benefit by legally authorized discrimination against women and 
minorities.  Most readily observable was the discrimination that occurred when 
legal issues requiring judicial decisions combined gender with other personal 
characteristics such as race, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and religion that was 
shared by disadvantaged minorities.
5
 
At the faculty level, mostly male professors taught core subjects such as Con-
tracts, Property Law, Constitutional Law, Torts, Criminal Law, Trusts, Tax Law, 
Jurisprudence, and Family Law.  These core subjects gave little or no attention to 
structural discrimination or bias in the substantive principles or to stereotypes and 
myths that influence factual determinations.
6
  Few or no questions were asked 
about how alternative views could be acknowledged in the resolution of legal 
problems.  Few, if any, critical courses found their way into the curriculum—not 
even as an optional offering.  Administratively, male colleagues comprised most 




As I saw it, the problem was a multilayered one.  There were problems with 
the law itself, problems spanning the legal profession in the composition of the 
bar, problems with the demographic breakdown of the judiciary
8
 and legal profes-
soriate, and problems with socially perpetuated stereotypical thinking favoring the 
dominant male population. 
                                                          
 3. My first influence was the work of Carol Gilligan in her book, In a Different Voice, but then 
several other American writers and activists in the women’s movement such as Catherine MacKinnon, 
Ann Scales, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Martha Fineman, Mari Matsuda, Richard Delgado, Jean Stefancic, 
Derrick Bell, Angela Harris,  Kimberlee Crenshaw, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Norma Wickler, Lynn 
Hecht Schfran, Patricia Williams and Canadian scholars such as Rosalie Abella, Christine Boyle, 
Constance Backhouse, Richard Devlin, Sheilah Martin, Lynn Smith, Freda Steele,  Beth Symes, Joan 
Ryan, Margrit Eichler, Donna Greshner, Jean McBean, Sarah Salter, Mary Eberts, Kathleen Lahey, 
Susan Boyd, Mary Jane Mossman, Isabel Grant, and numerous others influenced my thinking in their 
writing in the ‘80s and ‘90s about the inherent biases in the law and the legal system. 
 4. In Remembering Favourite Feminist Legal Scholarship, the authors highlight some defining 
moments of feminist engagement with the law from the mid 1980s to 2005 that captured the imagina-
tions of many of the feminist scholars of the time, including the author.  See generally Constance 
Backhouse et al., Remembering Favourite Feminist Legal Scholarship, 17 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 
243-70 (2005). 
 5. In Canada this is particularly true with respect to aboriginal women and men.  See generally 
Margo L. Nightingale, Judicial Attitudes and Differential Treatment: Native Women in Sexual Assault 
Cases, 23 OTTAWA L. REV. 71 (1991). 
 6. Constance Backhouse, Gender and Race in the Construction of “Legal Professionalism”: His-
torical Perspectives (Univ. of Ottawa, Working Paper, Oct. 2003), www.lsuc.on.ca/media/constance_ 
backhouse_gender_and_race.pdf. 
 7. BREAKING ANONYMITY: THE CHILLY CLIMATE FOR WOMEN FACULTY (1995) (discussing 
discrimination in Canadian universities including law schools). 
 8. These views were mirrored in the first editorial of the inaugural issue of the Canadian Journal of 
Women in the Law.  Backhouse et al., supra note 4 (“As we embark on the process of claiming equali-
ty as a concept that has meaning for women as well as for men, and as we begin the publication of a 
journal that has as one of its ultimate aims the transformation of the normative tradition itself, we are 
aware that this project is situated within deep contradictions in the liberal tradition.  Women are op-
pressed by the content of the law as well as by the ideas and conduct of many lawyers, judges, legisla-
tors, and law teachers.”). 
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All of this was occurring at the same time Canada was adopting a new Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms,
9
 which gave individual Canadians constitutional 
rights for the first time, including the most comprehensive equality rights in the 
western world.
10
  My view was that unless the legal community recognized judi-
cial gender and other forms of bias existed in the law and in judicial attitudes and 
took some educational initiatives to address them, the Charter and its promise of 
equality would have little chance of being fulfilled.  As a result, in 1986, with the 
help of my colleague Sheilah Martin (now Justice Martin) and students at the 
Faculty of Law at the University of Calgary, we organized the first national con-
ference on judicial attitudes in Canada.  The title of the conference was “The So-
cialization of Judges to Equality Issues.”11  It was chosen to emphasize the im-
portance of the social processes by which judges develop their attitudes, expecta-
tions and values, and to convey how those attitudes are crucial to the concept of 
equality and fairness in judicial outcomes.  The thought behind the conference 
agenda was that as social attitudes and conditions were changing in Canada, judg-
es must also change.  If not, the societally induced values they held could operate 
to perpetuate inequality.  During the conference, a judge I knew quite well from 
the Ontario Court of Appeal took me aside and asked me whether or not I had 
considered whether I could be found in contempt of court for the conference.
12
  He 
told me his brother judges had been discussing just that in the judicial lunchroom 
in Toronto because the conference program seemed to suggest judges were biased 
and such allegations, if unchecked, could bring the judiciary into disrepute.
13
  As 
it turned out, no contempt charges were laid, the conference was very well attend-
ed, and it was a sensation in the press.
14
  The conference papers published in 1987 
became the first collection of its kind in Canada and made a significant impact.
15
 
The conclusions of the majority of those attending the interdisciplinary con-
ference—judges, practicing lawyers, experts in anthropology, political science, 
sociology, Aboriginal Studies, and social welfare—were that in legal theory, dis-
crimination law, family law, tort law, criminal law, child law, aboriginal law, and 
human rights law, a pattern of non-neutral or biased judicial decision-making 
could be readily identified.  All three components of equality:  equality in law, 
equality in legal practice, and social practice of inequality were implicated in the 
                                                          
 9. See generally Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
 10. Id. The equality section of the Charter guarantees equality “before and under law” and equal 
protection and “equal benefit of law without discrimination . . . in particular, without discrimination 
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”  Id. 
at § 15(1).  Additionally, this “does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the 
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvan-
taged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disabil-
ity.”  Id. at § 15 (2).  Section 28 of the Charter guaranteed equal treatment of men and women and 
section 27 confirmed Canada as a multicultural nation.  Id. at § 28. 
 11. The conference took place May 22-24, 1986 in Banff, Alberta. 
 12. The judge was the late Hon. Justice Walter Tarnapolsky of the Ontario Court of Appeal.  Justice 
Tarnapolsky was supportive of the conference but nevertheless felt I needed to be warned. 
 13. Contempt of Court offences are listed in the Criminal Code of Canada and can include:  Failing 
to maintain a respectful attitude, remain silent or refrain from showing approval or disapproval of the 
proceeding; Interfering with the orderly administration of justice or to impair the Court’s authority or 
dignity.  Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
 14. Personal files of the author include copies of contemporaneous articles published at the time of 
the conference including copies published in the Calgary Herald and The Globe and Mail. 
 15. KATHLEEN E. MAHONEY, EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY (Sheilah L. Martin, ed., 1987). 
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findings with adverse results for equality seekers from disadvantaged minorities 
and for women. 
The experts at the conference found that when judges rely on traditional, lim-
iting, and inaccurate stereotypes (as defined generally by the majority), the equali-
ty rights of entire disadvantaged groups can be compromised.
16
  This tendency is 
exacerbated when judges assess individuals appearing before them based on stere-
otypical characteristics, abilities, and needs, with respect to social roles within 
those groups.
17
  Achieving fairness where public or private law rights are contest-
ed becomes very difficult, especially if the judge is unaware of the stereotypes he 
or she is using to define or characterize parties before the court.  When the stereo-
types used by the judge reinforces established patterns of discrimination, the judi-
cial decision itself has the effect of perpetuating inequality.  Participants at the 
conference called for judicial education as a way to deal with these problems of 
bias. 
Throughout this period of the late eighties and early nineties, other academics 
in Canada and the United States were aggressively critiquing judgments for gen-
der and other forms of inequality;
18
 test case litigation was successfully challeng-
ing biased assumptions and stereotypes in the jurisprudence and legislation;
19
 
more women were appointed to the bench than ever before;
20
 and law schools 
were admitting entering classes comprised of 50% to 60% women.
21
 
On the legislative front, feminist analyses and advocacy resulted in a major 
overhaul of the Criminal Code’s22 offence of rape.23  Prior to the overhaul in 
1983, deep-seated sex discrimination and gender bias were still pervasive in the 
law and its enforcement.  At that time, the patriarchal basis of marriage was pro-
tected by the law, even going so far as to give husbands unlimited sexual access to 
                                                          
 16. See Norma J. Wikler, Identifying and Correcting Judicial Gender Bias, in EQUALITY AND 
JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY 12 (Kathleen E. Mahoney & Sheilah L. Martin, eds. 1987); Margrit Eichler, 
Foundations of Bias: Sexist language and Sexist Thought, in EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY, 
supra, at 22; Joan Ryan, The Cultural Effects of Judicial Bias, in EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL 
NEUTRALITY, supra, at 346; Louise Mandell, Native Culture on Trial, in EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL 
NEUTRALITY, supra, at 358; Constance Backhouse, Nineteenth Century Judicial Attitudes Toward 
Child Custody, Rape and Prostitution, in EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY, supra, at 271; Andree 
Ruffo, Judicial treatment of Child Sexual Abuse: A Case Study, in EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL 
NEUTRALITY, supra, at 337; Christine Boyle & Susannah Worth Rowley, Sexual Assault and Family 
Violence: Reflections on Bias, in EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY, supra, at 312. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 19. The Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) was an equality advocacy group large-
ly made up of feminist academics who intervened in key equality cases before the Supreme Court of 
Canada to make arguments about structural inequality in existing case law and legislation with remark-
able success.  Many legal challenges to discriminatory laws and policies were successful in criminal 
law, tort law, family law, and administrative law.  See WOMEN’S LEGAL EDUC. & ACTION FUND, 
http://www.leaf.ca (last visited Aug. 25, 2015). 
 20. Mary Jane Mossman, Defining Moments for Women as Lawyers: Reflections on Numerical 
Gender Equality, 17 CAN. J. OF WOMEN AND THE L. 15, 15-25 (2015). 
 21. Id. at 19-20.  In 2006 in Ontario for example, 58.5% of lawyers under the age of 30 were wom-
en.  See MICHAEL ORNSTEIN, RACIALIZATION AND GENDER OF LAWYERS IN ONTARIO (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/convapril10_ornstein.pdf.  For further Canadian statistics com-
pared with American statistics, see Women in Law in Canada and the U.S., CATALYST.ORG, 
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-law-canada-and-us (last visited Aug. 25, 2015). 
 22. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
 23. Kwong-leung Tang, Rape Law Reform in Canada: The Success and Limits of Legislation, 42 
INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 258, 258-70 (1998). 
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their wives.  The law recognized that men had rights over their wife’s body simply 
by virtue of marriage.
24
 
Consequently, marital rape was not recognized as a crime.  Second, women’s 
testimony about sexual crimes was still not trusted.  The Criminal Code stated that 
it alone could not convict a defendant of rape.
25
  Consequently, rape complaints 
that were not made immediately after the attack were not considered and a wom-
an’s credibility depended on her sexual reputation.26  As a result, her previous 
sexual conduct could be questioned and the evidence used to invalidate her com-
plaint with respect to consent.
27
  Finally, women’s sexuality was defined by men’s 
sexuality in that the requirement of vaginal penetration was the only standard with 
which a woman’s body could be sexually violated in rape. 
The purpose of the amendments was to focus on the violence committed by 
the assailant rather than the sexual nature of the offence;
28
 to limit judicial discre-
tion linking prior sexual activity with credibility of the victim; and to recognize 
women’s autonomy in marriage.  As a result, the offence of rape was re-cast in 
gender-neutral terms.  A new three-tiered crime of sexual assault was enacted to 
capture degrees of additional violence perpetrated against women when they are 
sexually assaulted.
29
  The crime was defined as a form of assault not only to con-
test narrow societal understandings of rape but also to undo the myriad of sex 
discriminatory rules for the legal processing of rape.  The term sexual assault 
enabled women to charge their assailants with a range of sexual violations as op-
posed to merely the act of penetration.  The recent complaint requirement was 
abrogated,
30
 and the special rules of corroboration were repealed.  Inquiries into 
the complainant’s sexual conduct with other people were prohibited,31 and the 
defense of spousal rape repealed.  The conceptual shift of rape from being a prod-
uct of unequal power relationships in which women’s sexuality was commoditized 
was a welcome step towards women’s equality.32 
In concert with these changes, newly formed judicial education programs fo-
cused on multiple intersecting topics such as violence against women, racial bias, 
aboriginal concerns, treatment of child witnesses, and the economics of divorce, 
                                                          
 24. Prior to 1983 rape was explicitly defined in the Criminal Code to exclude marital rape from 
criminal sanction.  Section 143 read:  “A male person commits rape when he has sexual intercourse 
with a female person who is not his wife without her consent, or with her consent if the consent is 
extorted . . . , is obtained by impersonating her husband, or is obtained by false and fraudulent repre-
sentations as to the nature and quality of the act.”  Canada Criminal Code, S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 
135(a)-(b). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. 
 27. Evidence of women’s past sexual history was used to support rape “myths and stereotypes”—
particularly those that suggested a woman was more likely to consent to a sexual encounter if she had 
consented in the past.  Now this use is statutorily prohibited by Section 276 of the Criminal Code of 
Canada which was brought into force in 1992 and is known as rape shield provisions.  Criminal Code 
of Canada, R.S., 1992, c. C-46, s. 276.  Evidence of a complainant’s sexual history is not admissible to 
support an inference that the complainant is more likely to have consented or is less worthy of belief.  
Id. at s. 276(1). 
 28. Kwong-leung Tang, supra note 23, at 260. 
 29. Protecting Victims from Sex Offenders Act, S.C. 2010, c. 17. 
 30. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 276, 277. 
 31. Seaboyer v. Gayme, [1991] S.C.R. 577 (Can.) (holding the prohibition on questioning about past 
sexual history was found unconstitutional). 
 32. See Sheila McIntyre et al., Tracking and Resisting Backlash Against Equality Gains in Sexual 
Offence Law, 20 CAN. WOMAN STUD. 72 (2000). 
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taught with the goal of creating conditions favorable to achieving greater legal and 
social equality.
33
  Judges confronted their own pre-conceptions, and re-examined 
legal principles and procedures for many biases that had never been recognized 
before. 
For example, four years after the Banff conference in 1990, the first female 
appointee to the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice Bertha Wilson, gave instant 
credibility and prominence to the critique of gender bias in the law when she pub-
lically stated that true judicial neutrality can only be accomplished when the laws 
and the judicial system reflect female as well as male perspectives of the world.
34
  
In her historic speech at the Osgoode Hall Law School titled “Will Women Judges 
Make a Difference?” she stated: 
In some other areas of the law, however, a distinctly male perspective is 
clearly discernible.  It has resulted in legal principles that are not funda-
mentally sound and that should be revisited when the opportunity pre-
sents itself.  Canadian feminist scholarship has done an excellent job of 
identifying those areas and making suggestions for reform.  Some aspects 
of the criminal law in particular cry out for change; they are based on 
presuppositions about the nature of women and women’s sexuality that, 
in this day and age, are little short of ludicrous.
35
 
Wilson noted that male judges adhere to traditional values and beliefs about 
the nature of women and men and their traditional roles in society.  She concluded 
her remarks by calling for a government sponsored task force on gender bias and 
the development of judicial education programs, echoing the position taken by 
many of those presenting papers at the Banff conference.
36
  At the time of her 
speech in 1990, there were 849 federally appointed judges in Canada of whom 
only 73, or 9%, were women.
37
 
Even before Justice Wilson’s speech, Judge Doug Campbell, (as he then was) 
Chair of the Western Judicial Education Center,
38
 created a team
39
 to advise de-
signing and delivering judicial education programs on gender and other forms of 
bias in judicial decision-making, emphasizing the importance of social context 
education.  The controversial program rapidly expanded over the next several 
years, after which the National Judicial Institute
40
 passed a resolution in 1994 to 
explicitly support judicial education programs on social context, including “gen-
                                                          
 33. For a discussion of the Western Judicial Education Center programs, see GENDER EQUALITY 
AND THE JUDICIARY (Kirstine Adams & Andrew Byrnes eds., 1999). 
 34. See Bertha Wilson, Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?, 28 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 
507, 507-22 (1990). 
 35. Id. at 515. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Mary Jane Mossman, supra note 20. 
 38. He held this position until 1994, organizing several groundbreaking sessions for judges on issues 
concerning domestic and other violence against women as well as discrimination and inequality in the 
law on the grounds of race, gender, disability and other forms of disadvantage. 
 39. Feminist members of the initial team were Kathleen Mahoney, Sheilah Martin, Norma Winkler, 
and Lynn Smith, all of whom were professors of law at the time.  Norma Winkler was a sociology 
professor and was from the United States where she had pioneered judicial education programs with 
Lynn Hecht Schafran. 
 40. See generally NAT’L JUDICIAL INST., https://www.nji-inm.ca/nji/inm/a-propos-about/index.cfm 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2015). 
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der and race (Aboriginal peoples, blacks, and other visible minorities) to be com-
prehensive, in-depth and credible.”  In 1996, the Council mandated the National 
Judicial Institute (NJI) to initiate a national Social Context Education Project built 
on the work of the Western Judicial Education Center. 
Many senior judges, both in legal decisions and in speeches and published ar-
ticles, added their voices, underscoring the importance of social context awareness 
in achieving fair and just outcomes in judicial decisions.  For example, in the RDS 
case
41
 two Supreme Court of Canada judges opined that a conscious social context 
inquiry has become an accepted step towards judicial impartiality.
42
  Other Su-
preme Court judges such as Justice Michel Bastarache publically commented 
“[o]ur understanding of rules or laws is necessarily filtered through the context of 
our historical, legal and social cultures;”43 and in another speech said; 
Ever since cases decided by the Supreme Court concerning the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms began to dominate the legal scene in 
Canada, the importance of conducting a contextual analysis and taking an 
interdisciplinary approach has been stressed . . . .  This definitely means 
that we have to address a wider range of knowledge and skills in our 
training programs.  We have to realize that what we are doing is restruc-
turing our environment and that the legal context, in its modern sense, is 
very broad.”44 
Justice Iacobucci, also on the Supreme Court, stated, “the process of adjudi-
cation requires that we always bear in mind the moral underpinnings of our Con-
stitution and in particular the fundamental principle of equality;”45  Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé, more pointedly described the relevant social context saying: 
  “The contextual approach recognizes that the law cannot be di-
vorced or abstracted from social realities and that the legal rules will of-
ten have been designed around the interests of those who hold power.  As 
such, it becomes necessary to consider whether the experiences and per-
spectives of the more vulnerable and marginalized members of society 
have been excluded from the law’s development.”46   
Chief Justice of Alberta, Catherine Fraser, framed the educational challenge 
facing judges.  She stated: 
“to understand one’s own biases as well as those of the litigant before 
making a decision.  [If one does not,] a judge’s biases may lead him or 
                                                          
 41. R v. S (R.D.), [1997] S.C.R. 484 (Can.). 
 42. Id. 
 43. The Hon. Justice Michel Bastarache, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Domestic 
Application of International Values?”, Speech to the Association of Canadian Studies Conference on 
the 20th Anniversary of the Charter (Apr. 20, 2002). 
 44. Hon. Justice Michel Bastarache, “The Law’s Creative Power to Solve Present-Day Problems,” 
Speech to the Lord Reading Law Society (Jan. 13, 1999). 
 45. The Hon. Justice Frank Iacobucci, “The Broader Context of Social Context”, Remarks, Social 
Context Education Faculty and Curriculum Design Program 1, Part II (June 2001). 
 46. The Hon. Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, Beyond the Myths: Equality, Impartiality and Justice, 
10 J. SOC. DISTRESS & HOMELESSNESS 87, 94 (2001). 
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her to “mould” the facts of a case and thereby arrive at a decision based 
on an understanding that does not correspond entirely to reality . . . .  To 
understand context . . . , judges must understand people and powerless-
ness: in particular the protected class or group, their values, the reality of 
their lives and the relationship of that group to other groups in our socie-
ty.”47 
The judicial education movement grew not only in Canada in the years be-
tween 1986 and 2003.  Judicial education programs on gender, race, ethnic and 









 and Israel, with the involvement 
of Canadian experts, both judicial and academic.
52
  All these countries, as differ-
ent as they are in terms of culture, race, ethnicity, population, geography, govern-
ance and wealth, shared the same problem when it came to dealing with issues 
pertaining to women and minorities through the use of stereotypes and myths that 
compromised their legal and social equality.
53
 
Some of the more noteworthy judicial decisions of the time reflected the ad-
vocacy for substantive equality in the courts and the goals of judicial education 
programs towards generating greater understanding of social context.
54
  A land-
mark constitutional case in 1989 defined equality as being substantive and results 
orientated,
55
 rather than a formal, “sameness of treatment” concept.56  Under the 
                                                          
 47. The Hon. Catherine Fraser, Judicial Awareness Training, Remarks (1995). 
 48. LIVINGSTON ARMYTAGE, EDUCATING JUDGES:  TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF CONTINUING 
JUDICIAL LEARNING (1996). 
 49. The author was the Canadian Director of the first judicial education project in South Africa, 
partnering with Lawyers for Human Rights and the University of Capetown Law School. 
 50. The India project which included the author of this article and other members of the Western 
Judicial Education Center was conducted with the Supreme Court of India and a Women’s NGO 
named Sakshi, led by lawyer Nina Kapur. 
 51. The Vietnam project was started much later in 2003.  This CIDA project obtained by Agriteam 
Inc., through a competitive bidding process, was partnered with the University of Alberta.  A compo-
nent of the project called “JUDGE” (Judicial Development and Grassroots Engagement) had a social 
context and a human rights component that focused on educating judges and judicial educators. 
 52. The author was the Canadian Director of projects in both South Africa and Vietnam.  The South 
Africa project, funded by CIDA, partnered with Lawyers for Human Rights and Cape Town University 
where a Center for Gender, Race, and Class was created to educate judges on social context.  The 
Canadian participation initially included Judge Doug Campbell and Professor Shelia Martin (as she 
then was) and later included federal government representatives, as the program grew larger.  In Aus-
tralia, the author was a consultant to the Supreme Court of Western Australia and the Family Court of 
Australia in the early days of their judicial education programs on social contest issues.  The Canadian 
experts included the members of the Western Judicial Education Center faculty as well as senior judg-
es such as Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé and Catherine Fraser.  Social context education projects in 
India and Israel involved the same core Canadian group with other judges and academics participating 
from time to time. 
 53. This was recognized in the mandates of the various projects.  See for example, Vietnam, Judicial 
Development and Grassroots Engagement (JUDGE): January 2006-July 2011, AGRITEAM CAN., 
http://www.agriteam.ca/projects/profile/judicial-development-and-grassroots-engagement-judge/ (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2015).  See also supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 54. See Hon. Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, It takes a Vision: The Constitutionalization of Equality in 
Canada, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 363 (2002). 
 55. Andrews v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.).  This was followed by Eldridge v. 
British Columbia (Attorney General).  Eldridge v. B.C. (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (Can.) 
(holding that sometimes equal treatment means providing different services for different groups, in this 
case it meant deaf patients required interpreters in order to receive equal health benefits other patients 
received). 
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earlier Bill of Rights,
57
 the Supreme Court had interpreted its equality guarantee 
narrowly as a formal and procedural right rather than a substantive one.  In other 
words, if like people were treated the same, the treatment would not be subject to 




The Supreme Court firmly rejected this approach to equality in Brooks v. 
Canada Safeway Ltd., saying that it should be recognized that not all differences 
in treatment will result in inequality, and that identical treatment may result in 
inequality.  Applying the same legal rules to groups or individuals who are “simi-




Once the foundation for substantive equality was established with the re-
quirement of a context-based analysis, the Supreme Court had the necessary tools 
to find that pregnancy discrimination and sexual harassment
60
 were sex discrimi-
nation even though all women did not share the same experience, and men not at 
all.  The Court’s repudiation of its earlier pregnancy discrimination decision in 
Bliss
61
 signaled the insights of contemporary legal theory, including feminist legal 
theory, had made an impact on the Court’s traditional thinking.  Historically as-
signed social roles that downgraded women and failed to accommodate their 
childbearing needs were replaced by an understanding that the law must take into 
account the needs of working women.  The memorable words of the then Chief 
Justice Brian Dickson, “That those who bear children and benefit society as a 
whole thereby should not be economically or socially disadvantaged seems to 
bespeak the obvious,” was a high water mark for feminist understanding at the 
Supreme Court.  The earlier, groundbreaking abortion decision must have influ-
enced the Court’s thinking,62 and Justice Bertha Wilson could not have been more 
clear about putting women in the center of the analysis when she opined “[i]t is 
only women who bear children; no man can become pregnant.”63  Her legal rea-
soning focused on the well-being and dignity of Canadian women, taking into 
account their experiences, their unique reproductive capacity and their struggle for 
more equitable treatment.
64
  She made it abundantly clear that the key to alleviat-
ing injustice to women was to contextualize the constitutional analysis.  With 
respect to access to abortion, contextualization resulted in finding that in order to 
protect a women’s constitutional personal security guarantee, decisions early in 
the pregnancy must be solely those of the woman, not the state.
65
 
                                                          
 56. This was the test used in a pregnancy case, Bliss v. Att’y Gen. of Can.  Bliss v. Att’y Gen. of 
Can., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183 (Can.) (finding that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was found not 
to be sex discrimination by using the similarly situated test as between men and women.  Because men 
could not become pregnant, women are not similarly situated to them and therefore the denial of a job 
because of the plaintiff’s pregnancy could not be sex discrimination). 
 57. S.C. 1960, c. 44 (reprinted in R.S.C., 1985, App. 1|1). 
 58. Bliss, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183 (Can.). 
 59. Brooks v. Can. Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 (Can.) (overturning the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s earlier decision in Bliss, applying the principle of substantive equality to an employee disa-
bility plan that treated pregnant women differently from non-pregnant women and men). 
 60. Janzen v. Platy Enters. Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R.1252, para. 49 (Can.). 
 61. Bliss, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183. 
 62. Morgentaler v. The Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616 (Can.). 
 63. Brooks, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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Where battered women were concerned, Justice Wilson again brought a gen-
dered, social context perspective to create new law around the defense of self-
defense.  She said that to base self-defense on a “bar room brawl” model was un-
fair to women.  Instead, the test was one from a female normative standard.
66
  
Instead of applying “common sense” to decide whether or not the accused was 
acting in self-defense when she shot her partner in the back after he threatened to 
kill her, Justice Wilson said expert evidence of the battered woman syndrome 
must be heard, and if legal norms were to be altered to include and respond to the 
needs and reality of battered women, expert testimony was necessary.
67
  This 
holding explicitly realized the need for judicial education about battered women’s 
circumstances and situations, because in reality, most judges had little or no expe-
rience with these sensitive areas.
68
 
Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, the second woman appointed to our highest 
Court, focused on judicial and legislated use of gender-based stereotypes and 
myths that influence judicial decisions, especially in family and criminal law, 
showing how they undermined gender equality.
69
  In her dissent in R v. 
Seaboyer,
70
 she held the “rape-shield” provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada 
should have protected rape victims from certain sexist common law assumptions, 
e.g., that women who have sexual relations outside of their marriage are likely to 
consent to any sexual activity, or the assumption that these women are likely to lie 
under oath.  In Seaboyer, the accused challenged the rape shield laws, claiming 
they interfered with his rights to give full answer and defense to the charge.  Jus-
tice L’Heureux-Dubé would have found the exclusion of the evidence could not 
be a violation of the accused’s rights since the evidence required a rationale in-
voking sexist myths about women and rape.  The right to a fair trial conducted in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice does not include a right to 
introduce irrelevant evidence of a kind that has been proven to be a preemptively 
potent force in contorting and controlling the fact-finding process.
71
 
Justice Bertha Wilson once said in her speech, titled “Will Women Judges 
Make a Difference,” some aspects of the criminal law in particular cry out for 
change because they are based on presuppositions about the nature of women and 
women’s sexuality that, in this day and age, are little short of ludicrous.72  Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé later gave voice to the faulty and sexist logic underlying admis-
sible evidence in sexual assault trials.  She explained that rape myths are general-
ized and false beliefs about sexual assault that trivialize a sexual assault or suggest 
a sexual assault did not occur.  Although judges and lawyers unlikely perpetuate 
rape myths for malicious reasons, the use of these myths is sometimes just the 
normative reaction to a sexual assault case, but unfortunately, this status quo sur-
rounding rape myths has severe consequences for sexual assault victims and for 
maintaining sexual assault in our society.  The Justice also voiced many of these 
myths and stereotypes: 
                                                          
 66. R v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (Can.). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Brownmiller and Burt were the first to identify and discuss rape myths in our culture.  SUSAN 
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975); Martha R. Burt, Cultural 
Myths and Support for Rape, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 217 (1980). 
 70. R v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (Can.). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Wilson, supra note 34. 
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 Women fantasize about being rape victims; 
 Women mean ‘yes’ even when they say ‘no’; 
 Any woman could successfully resist a rapist if she really wished to; 
 That the sexually experienced do not suffer harms when raped (or at least 
suffer lesser harms than the sexually ‘innocent’); 
 Women often deserve to be raped on account of their conduct, dress, and 
demeanor; and 
 That rape by a stranger is worse than one by an acquaintance.73 
 
She pointed out that preceding legislative efforts in this domain had failed to 
stop the discriminatory treatment of female victims of sexual assault in the crimi-
nal justice and legal systems with the consequent discouragement of complaints.
74
  
She stated that that the stereotyping of victims in criminal sexual assault trials had 
proven so persistent that Parliament’s enactment of a clear restriction on the right 
of the defense to cross examine and lead evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual 
conduct had become necessary.
75
 
It is obvious that Justice L’Heureux-Dubé understood that when accused per-
sons are permitted to trade on rape myths to build a defense, the resulting distor-
tions in the outcomes of sexual assault trials negatively impact the position of 
women in society.  She understood that in sexual assault trials, judges must be 
cognizant that prejudice cuts two ways—prejudice to the accused but also preju-
dice to women’s position as full and equal participants in society.  The difficulty 
in resolving the problem is the deeply embedded understanding of fairness in 
criminal trials that has always focused on the accused, not on the unfairness 
caused by the use of sexist stereotypes.
76
 
In family law, the Justice wrote for the Court, giving legal recognition to the 
disproportionate impact that child bearing, marriage, and divorce, have on wom-
en,
77
 pointing out that although the Divorce Act
78
 is drafted in gender neutral lan-
guage, its practical effects often have gender consequences.  Attempting to ground 
family law in both common sense and reality, the justice rejected the self-
sufficiency model of divorce and replaced it with a compensatory framework that 
was more able to respond to the actual reality of many divorced women.  The 
guidelines she developed sought to accomplish an equitable sharing of the eco-
nomic consequences of marriage, requiring consideration of the economic and 
social realities for divorcing couples in Canada and the economic disadvantages 
faced by women resulting in the phenomenon of the “feminization of poverty.”  
She described the diminished earning capacity an ex-wife often experiences when 
she enters the labor force after years of reduced or non-participation in it:  her 
career choices may be seriously limited by her age and her lack of up-to-date 
knowledge of the business world.  If she has custody of children, she may be fur-
                                                          
 73. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Annalise Acorn, R v. Seaboyer: Pornographic Imagination and The Springs of Relevance, 3 
CONST. F. 1, 25-28 (1991) (providing a full discussion of the case and its implications), available at 
https://ejournals.library.ualberta.ca/index.php/constitutional_forum/article/viewFile/11945/9101. 
 77. Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 (Can.). 
 78. Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3. 
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ther limited by the need to be close to schools and the need to work regular, pre-




Justice L’Heureux-Dubé also pioneered Supreme Court jurisprudence in other 
areas of discrimination.  She led the Court in recognizing “non-traditional” mar-
riages, apparently convincing her fellow judges that they could decide in favor of 
gay and lesbian marriage rights without undermining traditional family values.  
She stated: 
[I]t is possible to be pro-family without rejecting the less traditional 
forms.  It is not anti-family to support protection for non-traditional fami-
lies.  The traditional family is not the only family form, and non-
traditional family forms may equally advance true family values.
80
 
The justice also pioneered in the area of tax law.
81
  In Symes v. Canada, when 
a female lawyer sought to deduct childcare costs as a business expense, Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé noted how the perception in the law of what constituted a valid 
business expense for the purpose of income tax deduction was based not on the 
everyday realities of businesswomen faced with the responsibility of child care, 
but was based rather on the stereotypical businessman who was unlikely to bear 
the primary duty in this regard.  In another tax case where gender discrimination 
was argued,
82
  the legislative method of taxation and deductions for child support 
payments was based on the assumption that divorcing individuals were a couple 
for tax purposes.  Justice L’Heureux-Dubé again in dissent, illustrated how a law 
that still treated former spouses as couples for tax purposes failed to comport with 
the reality of most custodial parents.  Similar to her decision in Mossop,
83
 she said 
that a contextual analysis would reveal the majority of custodial parents were 
women living in financially difficult circumstances with very little power over the 
actions or economic resources of former spouses.  Moreover, the assumption the 
family law system could adequately address concerns of custodial parents, who 
were usually women, did not account for the difficulties—practical, financial, or 
emotional—that were involved in seeking redress from the non-custodial spouse 
through that scheme.  Such a scheme was boldly discriminatory.
84
 
During her fifteen years on the Supreme Court from 1987 to 2002, Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé participated in over six hundred Charter of Rights decisions, 
many of which were profoundly significant and often controversial.
85
  The unique 
ways in which her work as a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada enhanced 
                                                          
 79. Moge, 3 S.C.R. at 863; see also KIRSTEN DOUGLAS, MOGE V. MOGE: A NEW VISION OF 
SPOUSAL SUPPORT (1993), available at http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp339-
e.htm. 
 80. Can. (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554, para. 119 (Can.). 
 81. Symes v. Can., [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695 (Can.). 
 82. Thibaudeau v. Can., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 (Can.). 
 83. Mossop, 1 S.C.R. 554. 
 84. Despite its “win” in Thibaudeau, Parliament amended the Income Tax Act in 1997 to eliminate 
the deduction formerly available to payors of child support and to end the requirement that the custodi-
al parent include child support as part of his or her taxable income.  Thibaudeau, 2 S.C.R. at 636. 
 85. See ADDING FEMINISM TO LAW: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF JUSTICE CLAIRE L’HEUREUX-DUBÉ 
(Elizabeth Sheehy ed., 2004) (discussing the Justice’s significant decisions) [hereinafter ADDING 
FEMINISM TO LAW]. 
12
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2015, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2015/iss1/4
No. 1] Judicial Bias 55 
women’s legal and social equality in Canada included contributions to family law, 
tax law, human rights law, immigration law, and criminal law.  She also worked to 
advance access to justice and the rights of Aboriginal people, gays and lesbians, 
and people with disabilities in Canada.
86
 
Both on the bench and as a public figure, the Justice unapologetically ad-
vanced a feminist analysis of law that served to enhance the quality of life for 
Canadian women and all equality seekers.
87
  The approach she brought to judging, 
defined by human compassion and an ability to see and understand the lived reali-
ty of people’s lives was unique and revolutionary. 
Though revolutionary, many of Justice L’Heureux Dubé’s analysis and ap-
proaches prevailed during the late 1990s and early 2000s.
88
  In 2002, the year she 
retired, her legacy with respect to substantive context-based equality rights lives 




III.  BACKLASH 
The myth of neutrality is one that has served to veil and protect the maleness 
of the judiciary for much of history.  Whenever the myth is challenged and there is 
the suggestion that women might bring a different approach to judging, male 
backlash occurs.
90
  Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s and Justice Wilson’s observations 
that women’s diverse experiences have been lacking in many areas of the law and 
their insistence on the necessity of incorporating them into judicial decisions, 
garnered both praise and condemnation.
91
  After she gave her famous lecture of 
“Will Women Judges Make a Difference” in 1990,92  Justice Wilson was criticized 
for being a feminist, for playing politics, for having a personal agenda, for not 
being impartial, and for destroying democracy.
93
 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé was the object of scurrilous public ignominy for her 
explicit critique of a lower court judge’s use of stereotypes in a rape case.94  In her 
                                                          
 86. See Hon. Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 54. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Shelly Gavigan, Outside/In: Lesbian and Gay Issues as a Site of Struggle in the Judgments 
of Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, in ADDING FEMINISM TO LAW, supra note 85, available at  
https://apps.osgoode.yorku.ca/osgmedia.nsf/0/8692378FDD46CCAB852571B9006F7851/$FILE/Outsi
de-in.pdf; see also generally ADDING FEMINISM TO LAW, supra note 85. 
 89. See, e.g., N.S. (Attorney General) v. Walsh, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325 (Can.) (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., 
dissenting) (case involving an unsuccessful claim for property by a common law spouse, and Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé forwarding arguments that would eventually undermine some of the earlier decisions 
regarding non-traditional marriages). 
 90. Dermot Feenan, Women Judges: Gendering Judging, Justifying Diversity, 35 J.L. & SOC’Y 490 
(2008). 
 91. Constance B. Backhouse, The Chilly Climate for Women Judges: Reflections on the Backlash 
from the Ewanchuk Case, 15 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 167 (2003). 
 92. Wilson, supra note 34. 
 93. See Robert E. Hawkins & Robert Martin, Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson, 41 MCGILL 
L.J. 1 (1995). 
 94. R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (Can.).  Justice L’Heureux-Dubé was responding to the 
comments of lower court Justice McClung’s characterization of the accused’s coercive advances as 
mere “clumsy passes” that were more “hormonal” than “criminal,” and that the complainant’s repeated 
“no’s” to her assailant’s advances were irrelevant, implying that a woman who conceived a child out of 
wedlock, living common-law with a male partner, was not capable of refusing consent.  Id. at 369, 372, 
376.  Justice L’Heureux-Dubé also pointed out the stereotypical treatment of the complainant when the 
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concurring judgment with the unanimous court in R v. Ewanchuck, she stated:  
“Complainants should be able to rely on a system free from myths and stereo-
types, and on a judiciary whose impartiality is not compromised by these biased 
assumptions.  . . . It is part of the role of this Court to denounce this kind of lan-
guage, unfortunately still used today, which not only perpetuates archaic myths 
and stereotypes about the nature of sexual assaults but also ignores the law.”95 
Amongst other things she was publically accused by the lower Court judge 
who had written the judgment, of “a graceless slide into personal invective,” and 
that her “personal convictions . . . delivered again from her judicial chair” could 
be responsible for the “disparate [and growing] number of male suicides being 
reported in the Province of Quebec.”96 
A prominent criminal lawyer, the late Edward Greenspan, stated in what was 
described as a “sledge hammer assault,”97 that Justice L’Heureux-Dubé was a 
bully and that her feminist influence “amounted to intimidation, posing a potential 
danger to the independence of the judiciary.”98  In his over-heated attack, the law-
yer did not describe the Justice’s judgment, quote from it, or even set out what it 
was that the lawyer found offensive.  To justify his remarks, it was enough to 
attribute to the Justice a mindless feminist ideology.  A portion of his comments: 
She was intemperate, showed a lack of balance, and a terrible lack of 
judgment. . . .  Feminists have entrenched their ideology in the Supreme 
Court of Canada and have put all contrary views beyond the pale . . . .  
The feminist perspective has hijacked the Supreme Court of Canada and 
now feminists want to throw off the bench anyone who disagrees with 
them.  Judge L’Heureux-Dubé was hell-bent on re-educating Judge 
McClung, bullying and coercing him into looking at everything from her 
point of view.  She raked him over the coals for making remarks that 
may, in fact, be accurate in the given case.  I don’t know.  But just as he 
had no empirical evidence to support his view (if you discount all of hu-
man history), she has no empirical evidence to say what she says (if you 
discount Catharine MacKinnon’s collected works). . . .  Madam Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé has shown an astounding insensitivity and an inability 
to conceive of any concepts outside her own terms of reference and has 
thereby disgraced the Supreme Court.
99
 
                                                          
lower court judge commented that she “did not present herself to Ewanchuk or enter his trailer in a 
bonnet and crinolines.”  Id. at paras. 88, 89. 
 95. Id. at para. 95. 
 96. Mr. Justice J.W. McClung, Court of Appeal of Alberta, Edmonton, “Right of reply” Letters to 
the Editor, NAT’L POST, Feb. 26, 1999, at A19; see also Alanna Mitchell et al., Legal Experts Out-
raged by Personal Attack on Supreme Court Judge, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 27, 1999, at A1 
(commenting on the unprecedented and unparalleled nature of the attack). 
 97. Mr. Justice Alex Kozinski, An Unfair Attack on a Decent Judgment, NAT’L POST, Mar. 8, 1999, 
available at http://www.fact.on.ca/newpaper/np99030x.htm. 
 98. Edward L. Greenspan, Judges have no right to be bullies, NAT’L POST, Mar. 2, 1999, at A18, 
available at http://www.fact.on.ca/newpaper/np99030l.htm.  See also Kozinski, supra note 97 (a 
critique of Greenspan’s editorial). 
 99. See Greenspan, supra note 98. 
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The depiction of such eminent jurists as ill-suited to judicial office serves to 
reinforce the perception of the woman judge as a threat to the order of law, draw-
ing upon the historical tropes of the feminine as disorderly or dangerous.
100
 
Justice L’Heureux Dubé noted that she was not alone in experiencing this sort 
of backlash.  She commented in 1997:  “Women judges and adjudicators are find-
ing themselves the targets of unfairly harsh criticism and allegations of bias, par-
ticularly but not exclusively when they have relied on a new perspective or more 
inclusive principles.”101  Notwithstanding the outspoken critics, optimists believed 
the promise of equality in the Charter seemed to be making progress and even the 
Chief Justice, Brian Dickson, felt the judicial approach of Bertha Wilson was 
visionary and embodied a distinctive and profoundly democratic conception of the 
role of the judge.
102
  Even so, most of the impressive landmark equality cases 
were discrimination cases based on the one enumerated ground of sex.  Very few 
cases involved intersecting forms of disadvantage such as race/ethnicity and sex 
discrimination.
103
  Even fewer succeeded.
104
 
As time went on, legislation and public policy began to erode the equality ad-
vances made in the ‘80s and ‘90s.  At the same time, the Supreme Court’s applica-
tion of the equality provisions became more and more complex and stringent.
105
  
The turning point in the equality jurisprudence was Law v. Canada,
106
 where the 
Supreme Court adjusted the Andrews
107
 equality test, making it much more diffi-
cult for plaintiffs to meet the requirements for proving discrimination.  The case 
involved eligibility with respect to survivor pension benefits.  The Court dis-
missed a section 15
108
 challenge brought by Nancy Law to provisions of the Can-
ada Pension Plan that denied her a survivor pension because she was under the age 
                                                          
 100. See Delia Santos, Shut Up or I’ll Kill You, Dangerous Ladies, Nineteenth and Twentieth Century 
Femininity in Literature and Film, CTR. FOR NEW DESIGN IN LEARNING & SCHOLARSHIP, 
GEORGETOWN UNIV., (April 27, 2010), https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/ds443-171project 
(exploring women as a source of instability and fear in fields such as mythology, the Bible, and ancient 
history).  See also M. Thornton, Authority and Corporeality: The Conundrum for Women in Law, 6 
FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 147 (1998). 
 101. See Dermont Feenan, Women Judges: Gendering Judging, Justifying Diversity, 35 J. LAW & 
SOC. 490, 499 (2008). 
 102. James MacPherson, Canadian Constitutional Law and Madame Justice Bertha Wilson - Patriot, 
Visionary and Heretic, 15 DALHOUSIE L. J. 217, 220 (1992); Brian Dickson, Madame Justice Wilson: 
Trailblazer for Justice, 15 DALHOUSIE L. J. 1 (1992). 
 103. This seems to have been recognized in a recent keynote speech by the Chief Justice to students 
at the University of Toronto Convocation when on the topic of women’s equality, she said:  “How do 
we move forward?  We need to challenge hidden assumptions and stereotypes about the contribution 
that women should be allowed to make, as well as the laws that perpetuate them.”  Brett Hughes, Great 
Strides But More Work to Be Done: Chief Justice, CAN. LAWYER MAG. (Oct. 20, 2014), 
http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/5326/Great-strides-but-more-work-to-be-done-for-women-chief-
justice.html.  McLachlin also said education is “one of the most important” contributors to equality, as 
it helps “lift people over barriers, and to lead them to better, more equal lives.”  Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See generally Jennifer Koshan, Under the Influence: Discrimination Under Human Rights Legis-
lation and Section 15 of the Charter, 3 C. J. HUM. RTS. 115 (2014). 
 106. Law v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 523-24 (Can.). 
 107. Id.  See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text for discussion of Andrews. 
 108. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  The Andrews test has 3 prongs:  1) Does the law treat 
the claimant differently from others, 2) do analogous grounds to those enumerated in § 15 of the Char-
ter exist, and 3) does the law have a discriminatory purpose or effect?  Andrews v. Law Soc’y of B.C., 
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.).  Law v. Canada added additional analytical requirements to determining 
whether or not the law was discriminatory, including listing factors that need to be considered for a 
contextual and purposive analysis.  Law v. Can., 1 S.C.R. 497. 
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of 35 at the time of her spouse’s death.  The issue was whether the sections using 
age as a criterion of entitlement to the survivor’s pension infringed section 15 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
109
  The case came before the Court 
in a time of uncertainty in the development of Section 15 jurisprudence, because 




In dealing with the pension legislation challenge, the Supreme Court decided 
to depart from the Andrews test,
111
 adding “human dignity” as an underlying value 
and requirement of a section 15 violation without giving it any clear definition.  
The lack of precision created a formidable barrier for claimants trying to prove a 
breach of section 15.  At the same time, its lack of clarity gave judges room to 
avoid consideration of social context and the social mechanisms that could impose 
and reinforce discrimination in a section 15 analysis.
112
  This occurred despite 
Justice Iacobucci’s stated intention when writing for the majority to create flexible 
guidelines.  The ultimate effect of Law became a rigid and complex test.
113
 
As a result of Law, in a series of decisions starting in 1999, fully half of the 
claimants that came before the Supreme Court failed to establish discrimination 
because they could not establish that the adverse treatment they experienced 
amounted to a violation of human dignity.
114
  Under the prior case law where the 
                                                          
 109. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.). 
 110. Law v. Can., 1 S.C.R. 497. 
 111. Id. at 522-24.  See also Koshan, supra note 105. 
 112. See Sheilah Martin, Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goods, 80 CAN. B. REV. 
299, 328-30 (2001) (discussing criticism of the introduction of the concept of dignity); June Ross, A 
Flawed Synthesis of the Law, 11 CONST. F. 74, 83 (1999), available at  
https://ejournals.library.ualberta.ca/index.php/constitutional_forum/article/view/11139/8551; Roger 
Gibbins, How in the World Can You Contest Equal Human Dignity?, 12 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 25 (2000). 
 113. The challenged law imposes (directly or indirectly) on the claimant a disadvantage (in the form 
of a burden or withheld benefit) in comparison to other comparable persons; the disadvantage is based 
on a ground listed in or analogous to a ground listed in s. 15; and the disadvantage also constitutes an 
impairment of the human dignity of the claimant.  The claimant is required to prove these three com-
ponents on a balance of probabilities, meaning that a court would need to find that it is more likely 
than not that a proposition the claimant advances is true.  This summary of the test is somewhat decep-
tive, however.  Although it may appear that there are only three parts to the test, each component 
includes subparts, all of which the claimant had to prove.  For additional commentary see Martha 
Butler, Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: The Development of the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s Approach to Equality Rights Under the Charter, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT 
RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications 
/2013-83-e.htm?cat=law. 
 114. Examples from the Supreme Court’s post-law jurisprudence include (in reverse chronological 
order): Alta. (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v. Cunningham, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 670 
(Can.) (adverse differential treatment of status Indians not discriminatory); Fraser v. Ont. (Attorney 
General), [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.) (adverse differential treatment of agricultural workers not discrimi-
natory); Withler v. Can., [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396 (Can.) (adverse differential treatment on the basis of age 
not discriminatory); Alta. v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (Can.) (adverse 
differential treatment on the basis of religion not discriminatory); A.C. v. Man. (Director of Child and 
Family Services), [2009] S.C.J. No. 30 (Can.) (adverse differential treatment on the basis of age not 
discriminatory); Ermineskin Indian Band & Nation v. Can., [2009] 1 S.C.R. 222 (Can.) (adverse dif-
ferential treatment of Indian bands not discriminatory); R v. Kapp, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (Can.) (adverse 
differential treatment on the basis of race not discriminatory); Health Servs. & Support-Facilities 
Subsector Bargaining Ass’n v. B.C., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (Can.) (adverse differential treatment on the 
basis of sex not discriminatory); Hodge v. Can. (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] 
3 S.C.R. 357 (Can.) (adverse differential treatment on the basis of marital status not discriminatory); 
Can. Found. for Children, Youth & the Law v. Can. (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (Can.) 
(adverse differential treatment on the basis of age not discriminatory); N.S. (Attorney General) v. 
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test in the Andrews case
115
 was applied, these cases would have been successful 
establishing prima facie discrimination in section 15 and the burden would then 
have passed to the government to justify it under section 1.  Because the claims 
could not get over the initial barrier of the dignity test, the government was not 
required to meet a burden of justification. 
In 2008, the Court began to distance itself from the requirement to prove a vi-
olation of human dignity in the discrimination analysis, but then replaced it with 
the requirement that the claimant show in addition to the other criteria that the 
adverse treatment was a result of the operation of prejudice or stereotype.  This 
new approach, perhaps unintentionally, created an additional barrier that resulted 
in even fewer equality cases succeeding.
116
  In his extensive analysis of section 15 
discrimination claims, Bruce Ryder reports the success rate for claimants making 
section 15 claims has declined sharply in recent years.  They have fallen to 11.6 
percent of reported cases in the five-year period from 2005 to 2009 from 16.4 
percent, and since 2009 the success rate has fallen even further to 7.2 percent.
117
  
The data compiled by Ryder
118
 provides strong support to the argument made by 
some critical socio-legal scholars that the promise held out by section 15 was a 
false promise, and that now many forms of inequality are beyond the reach of 
constitutional rights litigation. 
In a society still riven by deep structural inequalities on the basis of sex, race, 
ability and other prohibited grounds of discrimination, the rapidly decreasing suc-
cess rate of section 15 claims raises questions about judicial commitment to the 
constitutional equality guarantee, the composition of the bench,
119
 and the con-
comitant decline in judicial education programs on gender and other forms of bias 
in decision making.  Critics point out that the jurisprudence is moving back to a 
narrow formal equality standard that existed prior to the Charter.
120
 
A late and most revealing decision demonstrating the markedly different ap-
proach towards equality, especially with respect to gender equality on marriage 
breakdown,
121
 is the Supreme Court’s decision in Quebec (Attorney General) v 
A.
122
  The decision upheld legislation denying all common law spouses in Quebec 
                                                          
Walsh, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325 (Can.) (adverse differential treatment on the basis of marital status not 
discriminatory); Gosselin v. Que. (Attorney General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) (adverse differen-
tial treatment on the basis of age not discriminatory); Lovelace v. Ont., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (Can.) 
(adverse differential treatment on the basis of Aboriginal band status not discriminatory); Granovsky v. 
Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703 (Can.) (adverse differential 
treatment on the basis of physical disability not discriminatory); Winko v. B.C. (Forensic Psychiatric 
Institute), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625 (Can.) (adverse differential treatment on the basis of mental disability 
not discriminatory). 
 115. Andrews v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.). 
 116. Kapp, 2 S.C.R. 483.  See also Bruce Ryder, The Strange Double Life of Canadian Equality 
Rights, 63 S.C.L.R. 261, 265 (2013). 
 117. Ryder, supra note 116, at 270. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Justices Dickson, Wilson, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gontier, McIntyre, and Basterache, who penned 
some of the most influential substantive equality decisions, have long since retired from the Supreme 
Court and were leaders in developing the substantive equality jurisprudence. 
 120. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 121. The visionary Moge decision is one such example, as depicted by the strong equality input of 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé.  See Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 (Can.).  This concept was ignored 
by the majority, and was later cited in a dissent by Justice Abella in Quebec (Attorney General) v. A.  
See Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 61 (Can.). 
 122. Quebec v. A, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 61. 
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the right to claim support and the right to divide family property.  The Court up-
held the legislation notwithstanding the factual record that de facto couples form 
long-standing unions, they divide household responsibilities, they develop a high 
degree of interdependence, and the economically dependent spouse is faced with 
the same disadvantages when the relationship dissolves as a dependent married 
spouse faces.  The Court apparently ignored the significant disproportionate nega-
tive impact that marriage breakup has on women, and its implications for section 
15 analysis.  Instead it found the Quebec Civil Code was not discriminatory, em-
phasizing the objective of Quebec’s support law is to preserve freedom of choice 
and respect the dignity and autonomy of common law relationships.
123
  The stark 
difference between the majority and the dissent was Justice Abella’s focus on 
substantive equality principles that led her to be concerned with the protection of 
vulnerable spouses.
124
  The majority’s prioritization of autonomy and choice came 
from a formal equality analysis, where equality only requires both parties to be 
treated the same.  The feminization of poverty (which is understood to mean that 
women and children have little access to economic support either from their for-
mer spouses or the state) articulated in the Court’s earlier Moge v. Moge decision 
was cited in the dissenting judgment, but not considered by the majority.
125
  The 
result of the decision is that the legislation remains in place and upon the breakup 
of their common law relationships, women in Quebec are left entirely unprotected 
by the state with respect to support and sharing in matrimonial property. 
In other parts of the country, reports about ongoing bias and systemic dis-
crimination against women in custody and access disputes
126
 find that judges place 
reliance on reports that are biased and unfair to women—without questioning 
them or analyzing them for gender bias.  Recommendations for gender awareness 
training go unheeded.  Others find that despite reforms in the law and past educa-
tional efforts to sensitize the judiciary about the dynamics of domestic and sexual 
violence, the judicial treatment of these crimes remains a very serious problem in 
the operation of the law.
127
  Criminal law jurisprudence on violence against wom-
en shows a shift away from the enlightened reforms in the ‘80s and ‘90s to rid the 
law of sexually discriminatory myths and stereotypes.
128
  One new myth is the 
notion that somehow sexual assault is inherently less serious and harmful than 




This is unfortunately occurring despite national and international statistics 
demonstrating violence against women has not decreased, is severely underreport-
ed, and when reported, rates of perpetrators being charged and convicted are very 
                                                          
 123. Id. at 67 (the majority opinion was written by Justice LeBel). 
 124. Justice Abella wrote the dissenting opinion on both the breach and the section 1 analysis.  Id. at 
77-80. 
 125. Id. at 118.  See also Moge, 3 S.C.R. 813. 
 126. Shanaz Rahman & Laura Track, Troubling Assessments: Custody and Access Reports and Their 
Equality Implications for BC Women, WEST COAST LEAF, June 2012, at 18, available at 
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/WCL_TroublingAssessmentsCustodyAndAccessReports_6-2012.pdf. 
 127. Id. at 42-43. 
 128. David M. Tanovich, An Equality Oriented Approach to the Admissibility of Similar Fact Evi-
dence in Sexual Assault Prosecutions, in LAW, LEGAL PRACTICE, AND WOMEN’S ACTIVISM 559, 579 
(Elizabeth Sheehy ed., 2012), available at https://www.uwindsor.ca/law/tanovich/sites/uwindsor. 
ca.law.tanovich/files/tanovich-similarfactevidence_0.pdf; see also Kwong-leung Tang, supra note 23, 
at 258-70. 
 129. See Tanovich, supra note 128. 
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low, generally less than 10%.
130
  This very low conviction rate is of considerable 
concern, and quite likely relates to continuing negative views about women’s 
credibility.
131
  There may be other reasons as well, but it is certainly worthy of 
further research and analysis.  Studies indicate women’s disadvantage intersects 
with other types of disadvantage, and the problem of conviction rates and investi-
gations becomes exacerbated.
132
  It is a particularly serious problem for aboriginal 
women, poor women, and women of racial and ethnic minorities.
133
  One only has 
to look at the example of what has been acknowledged about the treatment of 
aboriginal women and girls by the justice system in the Report of the B.C. Mur-
dered and Missing Women Inquiry
134
 to understand the extent of and depth of the 
problems.  The report found that starting in the 1960s there have been over 1000 
unsolved cases of missing and murdered Aboriginal women in Canada.
135
  Un-
documented and unreported instances are thought to run much higher.
136
 
Myths about women’s sexuality and sexual assault crimes are perpetuated and 
exaggerated by the media and pop culture.
137
  Studies indicate media and pop 
culture create negative effects towards women, female credibility, and female 
equality.
138
  They also carry the ability to influence the criminal justice system.
139
  
Researchers investigating the prevalence of rape myths in the news media and the 
causal effects of exposure to these rape myths find these myths, and more im-
portantly, the impact of these myths after only brief exposure, is sufficient to tem-
porarily trigger negative thoughts toward sexual assault victims and heightened 
                                                          
 130. HOLLY JOHNSON, NATALIA OLLUS & SAMI NEVALA, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2008).  The BC Women’s Hospital and Health Centre in Vancouver 
recently conducted a study that showed that out of 568 sexual assault files opened over a two-year 
period, where 291 women decided to report to the police—of those, the conviction rate was only 6%, 
and only 48 of the 291 women who reported to the police entered the criminal justice system.  Id.  Of 
those 48, there were 18 convictions (eight guilty pleas at or close to trial, and 10 findings of guilt); 25 
stays of proceedings by the Crown (decisions by the Crown not to Proceed), 2 acquittals, 2 arrest 
warrants, and 1 trial in progress).  Id.; see also, Larry Wilson, Victims of Sexual Assault: Who Repre-
sents Them in Criminal Proceedings?, THE LAW SOC’Y OF UPPER CAN., http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/ 
eleventh_colloquium_wilson.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2015). 
 131. See Tanovich supra note 128, at 579. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 570. 
 134. ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, MISSING AND MURDERED ABORIGINAL WOMEN: A 
NATIONAL OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW (2014), available at http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/pubs/mmaw-
faapd-eng.pdf [hereinafter RCMP]; Missing and Murdered Aboriginal Women and Girls: Understand-
ing the Numbers, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnesty.ca/blog/missing-and-murdered-indigenous-
women-and-girls-understanding-the-numbers (last visited Aug. 27, 2015). 
 135. See RCMP, supra note 134. 
 136. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 134. 
 137. See SUSAN J. DOUGLAS, THE RISE OF ENLIGHTENED SEXISM:  HOW POP CULTURE TOOK US 
FROM GIRL POWER TO GIRLS GONE WILD (2010); For a listing of examples of media, pop culture and 
violence against women commentaries, see Violence Against Women, THE FREE RADICAL, http://www. 
thefreeradical.ca/violenceAgainstWomen.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2015). 
 138. DOUGLAS, supra note 137; see also Attitudes, Media and Culture, THE FAWCETT SOC’Y, 
http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/our-work/issues/attitudes-media-culture/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2015). 
 139. For a general discussion of the effects of technology and media on crime, see JACQUELINE B. 
HELFGOTT, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR:  THEORIES, TYPOLOGIES, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 367 (2008), avail-
able at https://us.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/19507_Chapter_10.pdf (Chapter 10: 
The Influence of Technology, Media, and Popular Culture on Criminal Behavior). 
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thoughts of victim-blame.
140
  In Canada, Shannon Sampert studied 1,532 press 
articles demonstrating that the myths and stereotypes associated with sexual as-
sault cases in the courts are the same as those held in the broader society.
141
  She 
documents how journalists and journalistic conventions position rape as a “sex 
crime,” as opposed to an act of violence, and portrays women victims as dishonest 
while portraying male perpetrators as innocent.
142
  In another of her studies she 
examined a popular radio host’s daily news analysis, showing how equality rights 
are framed and expressed in a way that promotes class, race, and gender antago-
nisms, creating the impression that “ordinary” Canadians are in a struggle for 
power with special interests groups including minorities and women.
143
  This form 
of backlash threatens to further discredit equality agendas of activists and narrows 
the scope of equality claims, making it all the more important that judges and 
other actors in the judicial system be equipped with the skills to analyze and eval-
uate these stereotypes for what they are when they are manifested in the law or in 
trials and appeals before the Courts.  When negative myths and stereotypes do 
inform judicial thinking, consciously or unconsciously, reporting, conviction, and 
sentencing decisions are affected in ways that diminish the victim’s rights to 
equality before the law.
144
  The problem becomes compounded when the court’s 
legal analysis is both abstract and decontextualized.  As such, it is often impossi-
ble to determine if the analyses of the women’s situations are receiving sufficient 
attention in the judicial decision.
145
 
IV.  GENDER BIAS IN JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 
A similar backslide is observable in judicial appointments over the past eight 
years in Canada.  While law schools today graduate more women than men,
146
 and 
the bar has become more or less gender balanced,
147
 recent federal appointments 
to the bench grossly under represent women and minorities.
148
  Presently in Cana-
da there are 406 female judges out of 1,168 sitting judges, or about 35%,
149
 but the 
                                                          
 140. For a comprehensive discussion and study about the prevalence and impacts of rape myths and 
stereotypes see Renae Franiuk et al., Prevalence of Rape Myths in Headlines and Their Effects on 
Attitude Towards Rape, AURORA UNIV. (2008), http://web.aurora.edu/~rfraniuk/franiuk_rapemyth 
headlines_sexroles.pdf. 
 141. Shannon Sampert, Let Me Tell You a Story: English Canadian Newspapers and Sexual Assault 
Myths, 22 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 301, 301-28 (2010). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Shannon Sampert, Verbal Smackdown: Charles Adler and Canadian Political Talk Radio, in 
HOW CANADIANS COMMUNICATE POLITICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION (David Taras & Christopher 
Waddell eds., 2011). 
 144. See T. BRETTEL DAWSON, WOMEN, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CORE READINGS AND CURRENT 
ISSUES (2002). 
 145. See Tanovich, supra note 128. 
 146. Women in Law in Canada and the U.S., CATALYST KNOWLEDGE CTR., http://www.catalyst.org/ 
knowledge/women-law-canada-and-us (last visited Aug. 27, 2015); 2010 Law Societies Statistics, 
FED’N OF LAW SOC’YS OF CAN., http://www.flsc.ca/_documents/2010-Statistical-Report.pdf (last 
visited May 1, 2015). 
 147. See 2010 Law Societies Statistics, supra note 146. 
 148. See Gill & Shaw, supra note 1. 
 149. Number of Federally Appointed Judges as of July 1, 2015, OFFICE OF THE COMM’R FOR FED. 
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS CAN., http://www.fja.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/judges-juges-eng.html (last 
visited Aug. 27, 2015); see also Wojtek Gwiazda, Is Canada Appointing Enough Female Judges?, 
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overall rate of female appointments is declining.  In 2011, only eight women, 
about 16% of the 49 appointments, were appointed to the federal judiciary from a 
pool of about 500 applicants.
150
  In the past 5 years, of the 197 federal judicial 
appointments made, just three were people of color.
151
  The appointment rate for 
Aboriginal judges is 1.04% and just .5% for visible minority judges, despite 4.3% 
of the Canadian population being aboriginal
152
 and 19% being comprised of visi-
ble minorities.
153
  The visible minority population in large urban centers is signifi-
cantly greater.  For example, Vancouver has a 45.2% visible minority population 
and Toronto, 47%.
154
  The most recent data on judicial appointments indicates the 
typical lawyer appointed to the bench is a white 53 year old male, and a civil liti-
gator practicing in a firm of more than 60 lawyers,
155
 who would not, as a rule, 
practice family law, human rights, immigration law or aboriginal rights which are 
of course areas of particular concern to women and minorities.
156
  Justice Donna 
Martinson of the British Columbia Supreme Court and Professor Marjorie Griffin 
Cohen of Simon Fraser University concluded in a recent article on the importance 
of gender balance and diversity within the judiciary in the province of British 
Columbia: 
The under-representation of women and ethnic minorities on B.C.’s high-
est trial court is discriminatory and needs to change.  The lack of family 
law expertise adds to the problems created.  The Minister of Justice has 
an obligation to the people of British Columbia to take immediate action 
to create a Court that truly represents all of the people of British Colum-
bia and their interests.  We deserve no less.
157
 
The advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity for the Judiciary of England and 
Wales commented similarly, adding that an unrepresentative judiciary creates a 
democratic deficit: 
In a democratic society it is unacceptable for an unelected institution that 
wields the power of the judiciary to be drawn from a narrow and homog-
enous group that reflects neither the diversity of society nor that of the 
legal profession as a whole.  Failure to appoint well-qualified candidates 
                                                          
RADIO CAN. INT’L (Sep. 3, 2014), http://www.rcinet.ca/en/2014/09/03/is-canadian-government-
appointing-enough-women-judges/. 
 150. Kirk Makin, Appointments of Female Judges Slump Under Harper’s Tories, GLOBE & MAIL 
(Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/appointments-of-female-judges- 
slump-under-harpers-tories/article4183464/. 
 151. James Morton, Diversity Bypasses the Bench, TORONTO STAR (Jan. 8, 2012),  
http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2012/01/08/diversity_bypasses_the_bench.html#. 
 152. STATISTICS CAN., ABORIGINAL PEOPLES IN CANADA: FIRST NATIONS PEOPLE MÉTIS AND INUIT 
6 (2011), available at http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/as-sa/99-011-x/99-011-x2011001- 
eng.cfm. 
 153. Id. at 14. 
 154. Id. at 17. 
 155. Cristin Schmitz, Gender Equality in Judiciary Urged, THE LAW. WKLY., Apr. 16, 2012, at 1, 3. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Marjorie Griffin Cohen & Donna Martinson, Supreme Court of B.C.: Who’s the Judge?, 
VANCOUVER SUN (Oct. 22, 2012) http://www.vancouversun.com/opinion/op-ed/Supreme+Court+ 
judge/7427983/story.html#__federated=1. 
21
Mahoney: Judicial Bias: The Ongoing Challenge
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
64 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2015 




In August of 2013, the Canadian Bar Association took a public stance on the 
lack of diversity in the federal judiciary, pointing out “the low number of women 
and members of racialized and other minority groups appointed to the federal 
courts does not reflect the gender balance or diversity in the Canadian popula-
tion.”159 
In June of 2014, the federal Justice Minister, Peter MacKay, who controls all 
of the federal appointments to the judiciary, stunned several lawyers at a meeting 
of the Ontario Bar Association when he was asked about the dearth of women and 
visible minorities on federally appointed courts.  His response was that they just 
“aren’t applying” for the jobs.160  MacKay went on to frame his justification in 
terms of motherhood stereotypes, opining that women fearing an “old boys” net-
work on the bench might dispatch female judges to circuit work for cases in 
courthouses across a region—a prospect the minister described as unappealing for 
women with children at home.  He went on to reference his wife, home with their 
young child, as an example.
161
  Though the Justice Minister’s acceptance of the 
traditional stereotype that women’s place is in the home was bad enough, by total-
ly ignoring the part of the question that asked him about the dearth of minority 
appointments to the judiciary, he demonstrated that he failed to even see the ques-
tion as relevant or important at all.
162
 
By appointing almost exclusively white male lawyers to the bench when 
many women and minorities are qualified and have applied, the Justice Minister is 
perpetuating the myth that women and minorities are unsuited for judging and 
judicial authority.  Based on white, male-centered perspectives, norms and imag-
es, these notions are linked to broader structural and systemic exclusions of wom-
en and minorities from judicial offices that have the male “authoritative knower” 
at their core.
163
  Women and minorities become the “other” to the image of judi-
cial authority.
164
  The argument that male judges may need to make room for 
women judges and minorities has been partly defended on the apparently neutral 
grounds of appointment for “merit” or preserving judicial “impartiality.”  Given 
the disproportionate numbers of white male judges, the implicit suggestion is that 
merit and impartiality is more often to be found among white males than others.   
                                                          
 158. ADVISORY PANEL ON JUDICIAL DIVERSITY, THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL ON JUDICIAL 
DIVERSITY 2010 15 (2010), available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-institute/files/ 
Report_of_the_Advisory_Panel_on_Judicial_Diversity.pdf. 
 159. Dean Crawford, Diversity on the Bench: What can we do about it?, THE CANADIAN BAR 
ASSOC’N (June 1, 2014), http://www.cbabc.org/Professional-Development-Resources/Publications/BC-
Publications/BarTalk/2014/BarTalk-June-2014/Diversity-on-the-Bench (referring to CBA Resolution 
13-04-A, Equality in Judicial Appointments, approved August 18, 2013, no longer available online). 
 160. Peter McKay and the Mystery of the missing female judges, GLOBE & MAIL (June 22, 2014), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/editorials/peter-mackay-and-the-mystery-of-the-
missing-women-judges/article19275200/. 
 161.  Id. 
 162. See Women in Law in Canada and the U.S., supra note 146. 
 163. See generally MARGARET THORNTON, DISSONANCE AND DISTRUST: WOMEN IN THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (1996). 
 164. See Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, Outsiders on the Bench: The Continuing Struggle for Equality, 16 
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 15 (2001); Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Woman Has Robes: Four Questions, 14 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 489 (1984). 
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This is not merely offensive; it demonstrates the assessment and the definition 
of merit and impartiality that need to be reconsidered.  It cannot be true that “mer-
it” on any rational test is scarcer among women and ethnic minorities.165  The 
government apparently does not consider the ability to contribute to a diverse 
judiciary to be meritorious,
166
 or that the assumed neutrality of male judges should 
be questioned.
167
  It is now obvious that in many areas of law, male biases are 
easily discernible,
168
 and the myth of male neutrality can no longer be sustained.  
At the same time, the need for diversity, equal opportunity, representativeness, 
democratic legitimacy, enhancement of public trust, and confidence in the judici-
ary is a recognized imperative.
169
  In a number of jurisdictions, the processes, 
procedures, and criteria for judicial appointments have been reformed to create 
more diversity on the bench,
170
 yet the Justice Minister of Canada remains unper-
suaded.  The only changes he has made to the composition of the judiciary have 
been to increase the complement of white males.
171
  From looking at the current 
state of affairs, the attitudes of some of those in power have not changed since 
1990, when former Justice Wilson was criticized “for playing politics,” and “not 
being impartial” for suggesting that more women should be appointed as judges in 
order to bring alternative perspectives to judging.
172
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The debate about how much judges should think about social context and the 
wider social implications of their work stretches back to a classic 1897 essay in 
the Harvard Law Review called “The Path of the Law.”  U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., decried the “blackletter man” who learned the 
law as a closed system of knowledge based on past precedents, without reconsid-
ering whether laws are working for the public good.
173
  Chief Justice Dickson of 
                                                          
 165. See Morton, supra note 151; B. Hamilton, Criteria for Judicial Appointment and “Merit”, 15 
QUEENSLAND UNIV. TECH. L. REV. 10 (1999); Hilary Sommerlad, Can Women Lawyer Differently? A 
Perspective from the UK, in WOMEN AND THE WORLD’S LEGAL PROFESSION 191 (Schultz & Shaw 
eds., 2003). 
 166. See Alan Paterson & Chris Paterson, We need to rethink how we define merit for Supreme Court 
appointments, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 26 2012, 13:19 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/ 
mar/26/rethink-merit-supreme-court-appointments. 
 167. See MAHONEY, supra note 15; WOMEN AND THE LAW: JUDICIAL ATTITUDES AS THEY IMPACT 
ON WOMEN (Anne Thacker ed., 1998); R. GRAYCAR & J. MORGAN, THE HIDDEN GENDER OF LAW (2d 
ed. 2002); M. Omatsu, The Fiction of Judicial Impartiality, in FEMINISM, LAW, INCLUSION:  
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 169. GEOFFERY BINDMAN & KARON MONAGHAN, JUDICIAL DIVERSITY:  ACCELERATING CHANGE 
(2014), available at http://ukscblog.com/judicial-diversity-accelerating-change-report-published/. 
 170. See MAHONEY, supra note 15; WOMEN AND THE LAW: JUDICIAL ATTITUDES AS THEY IMPACT 
ON WOMEN, supra note 167; GRAYCAR & MORGAN, supra note 167; M. Omatsu, supra note 167. 
 171. See Women in Law in Canada and the U.S., supra note 146. 
 172. This was the position of REAL Women in a letter to the editor.  See Bertha Wilson, pro-feminist, 
anti-family, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 24, 1990, at D3. 
 173. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); see also Court-




Mahoney: Judicial Bias: The Ongoing Challenge
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
66 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2015 
the Canadian Supreme Court also believed in this importance of legal learning 
outside the confines of doctrine: 
It is essential that law schools and indeed the entire legal profession, 
devote a great amount of attention and energy to studying and under-
standing some of the deep social problems of our time—problems of pov-
erty, inequality and the environment.  If the legal profession as a whole is 
to help solve some of the seemingly intractable difficulties faced by the 
poor . . . native people, other minorities, new immigrants, and others, it 
seems to me that process must start in Canadian law schools.
174
 
When traditional qualifications to be appointed to the judiciary require a can-
didate to be from an elite, white, male group whose qualifications required no 
more than mastery of existing laws and knowledge of how to apply them, it is 
highly foreseeable that their judgments will not address the broader public good. 
Today, widespread acknowledgment that justice is often not working for the 
public good underscores the need for new and innovative education programs for 
judges and other members of the profession.  Decades of scholarship have shown 
how systemic social biases based on criteria such as race, gender, sexual orienta-
tion, or ideology find their way into written laws and judgments, and judges don’t 
always have the tools to identify or counteract the injustices that result.  The crea-
tor of Harvard Law School’s new “Systemic Justice” program says:  “If you’re 
thinking about systemic justice, you need to be thinking about legal education . . . 
”; the professor creating the program also believes that this education should be 
less about learning the status quo and more about how the next generation of law-
yers can change it.
175
 
Going beyond legal doctrine to understand how history, psychology, and eco-
nomics explain the causes of injustice or how societal norms with respect to gen-
der, race, ethnicity or sexual orientation could unconsciously affect judicial deci-
sion making requires a commitment to examine both the substance and process of 
the law in these broader contexts.  Equality seekers argue that to fully understand 
the requirements of equality, judges must also augment and update their education 
on a regular basis to be sensitive to increasingly insidious forms of discrimination, 
hone their abilities to critically evaluate existing concepts of equality, and develop 
their capacity to formulate new methods of thought and understanding. 
In the late 1980s and early ‘90s in Canada, coincidental with the developing 
jurisprudence under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
176
 robust judi-
cial education programs were designed and implemented on the topic of equality, 
especially with respect to categories of disadvantage.  Within five years, social 
context education for judges was institutionalized as a distinct part of the judicial 
continuing education curriculum offered by the National Judicial Institute (NJI).  
But, in 2003 the national program, with equality and equal justice at its core, was 
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suddenly dropped as a standalone category of continuing judicial education.  The 
explanation provided by the NJI was social context education was to be integrated 
into broader optional programs as one of three components of judicial education 
along with substantive law and skills development.
177
  This decision should be re-
thought because its effect is to downgrade social context education to that of an 
“add-on” or a minor concern with greater emphasis on technical competency ra-
ther than on judicial fairness. 
The constant turnover among judicial personnel underscores the need for so-
cial context education to be an enduring effort and priority.  New emerging stereo-
types particularly with respect to gender, such as the myth that Canadian men and 
woman are equal now in terms of income and status with no existing innate barri-
ers, must be challenged.  If Courts accept this stereotype they could be widening a 
gap that already exists.
178
  Supreme Court of Canada Justice Rosalie Abella com-
mented on this myth when she said:
179
 
But for every woman in the thousands whose glass ceiling has been melt-
ed, shattered or raised, there are women in the millions who think a glass 
ceiling is just one more household object to polish.  There is still a huge 
gap between what the public thinks has happened to women, because 
several thousand have had the luck, guts, finances, friends, encourage-
ment or supportive partners to break barriers, and what is really happen-
ing for the majority of women.
180
 
She says these women “are waiting for equality to hit home; they are waiting 
for the rhetoric of equality they can hear to turn into the reality of equality they 
can live.”181  Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin, the present Chief Justice of Cana-
da says we must challenge the “hidden assumptions and stereotypes about the 
contribution that women should be allowed to make,” as well as “the laws that 
perpetuate them.”182  Education is “one of the most important” contributors to 
equality, as it helps “lift people over barriers, and to lead them to better, more 
equal lives.”183 
In order for the education referenced by the Chief Justice to be effective, it 
should allow judges to critically analyze existing case law, identify and question 
the steps in a judgment’s logic, and present new lines of legal argument.  The 
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types of questions that need to be asked are:  what would equality look like if 
women’s and other minorities’ perspectives were taken seriously?  What if reali-
ties of poverty, disability, racialization, exclusion and power were placed at the 
center of the legal analysis, not its margins?  If we took substantive equality seri-
ously, how would the law be different?  Why are the courts not recognizing real-
world harms caused by systemic discrimination?  Questions should be asked about 
how evidence is treated, what dynamics are unquestioned or unexamined, and 
how constitutional remedies are applied.  Ultimately, judicial education should 
open up the judicial dialogue to hear the voices of those most in need of equality 
rights. 
To revitalize social context education, equality, and judicial impartiality, ju-
dicial diversity must be addressed.  For many years, judicial appointments in Can-
ada have not been at all consistent with equality, and consequently, impartiality.
184
  
Female representation grew to a high point of about 34% in the early 2000s, but 
the representation of racial, ethnic, disabled, and sexual minorities on the judicial 
bench has been almost non-existent.
185
  In recent times, the overwhelming prefer-
ence for white, male appointments from elite law firms demonstrates the Canadian 
government’s unwillingness to address the biased structure of the judicial system.  
By failing to incorporate the appropriate ratio of women or minorities into judicial 
office, public confidence in the judiciary and the law is being undermined.  The 
official position that they are “guided by the principles of merit and legal excel-
lence in the selection of judges” bears no credibility.186  Minority groups have 
protested, stating the Government equates merit to skin color, failing to see merit 
in the contributions aboriginal lawyers and lawyers from racial minority commu-




In closing, three comments by each of three great champions of equality on 
the Supreme Court summarize the contention that judicial bias is an on-going 
challenge that needs to be conquered.  In 1990, Justice Bertha Wilson in her fa-
mous speech “Will Women Judges Make a Difference?” asked for patience and 
long term commitment to the goal of equality.  She said:  “In order to change the 
legal culture—to have it absorb new ideals and shape them into legal doctrine, 
much more needs to be done.”188  Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé’s inspirational 
comments in 2002 also gave us reason to never give up the struggle, when the 
Justice said what has kept her so committed to equal justice is her firm belief “that 
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justice without equality is no justice at all.”189  Finally, the current Chief Justice 
Beverly McLachlin in 2012 underscored the need for judicial diversity when she 
said:  “If we are to fully meet the challenges of judging in a diverse society, we 
must work toward a bench that better mirrors the people it judges.”190 
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